

Session III

An View of World Affairs and Peace  
in NE Asia gathered up  
in the Korean Peninsula

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# Mood around the Korean peninsula and view on peace in northeastern Asia

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## **I. New movement of order in East Asia**

Asia now is at an era of reconstruction of order that is as rare as in every 50 to 100 years. This organization of security is an extension of a movement started globally since the end of the Cold War.

The most influential factor on the security of East Asia is the Rise of China and the strengthened alliance of the U.S. and Japan. However, due to the Rise of China, “for the first time in the modern times, we are in an era where strong China and strong Japan coexist.”

In the process of China economically outrunning Japan, a great conflict is expected. The current political and diplomatic conflict appears inevitable among the competition for the leadership in the area between Japan and China which is of 10 folds in population. As Japan is becoming aware of its international influence weakening due to its recent, comparable decrease in economical strength as a ‘situation to be avoided,’ new responses are being prepared.

In “mapping the Global Future” released by National Intelligence Council (NIC) in January 2005, it is viewed that China and India will appear as influential actuators in global stage within next 15 years. It is yet to be seen if China would be at a position to compete against the U.S. power, but depending on the speed of the growth of Chinese economy in the next 20 years, the table maybe turned. If China does outrun Japan and becomes the wealthiest nation in Asia, it may, at least in East Asia, become the strongest as well.

Among these changes is Korea. During the Cold War, Korean peninsula was the colliding surface between the Northern Triangle and the Southern Triangle. Since the establishments of diplomatic relations between Russia and China in the early 1990's, and after the summit talks between the North and South Korea, militaristic tension has been much dissolved. However, there still lacks diplomatic relationship between the North Korea and the U.S. and between the North Korea and Japan, and the tension still resides in South Korea due to the continuing unstable government system based on armistice agreements. On top of that was the nuclear crisis of the North in October 2002, and as North Korean - American relationship worsened, relationship between North and South Korea seemed grim as well.

Luckily, the 9.19 joint statement was signed at the fourth six summit talk held in June ~ September of 2005, stating principles for resolving North Korean nuclear conflicts. As the goal of the talk, this statement projects 'denuclearization of Korean peninsula' and, further, 'stability and peace in overall Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula.' This foresees the reorganization of order in Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula after the resolution of the nuclear conflict. The statement notes "the directly related parties will negotiate at permanent peace régime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum", which is an indication of a great change in overall North and South Korean relationship if the goal of the statement is realized.

The six summits talk was cancelled due to the light-water reactor issues followed by the financial restraint by the U.S. after the first phase of the fifth conference in 2005, but was revived 13months later in December 2006. As this long fruitless time was finally over, at the third phase of the fifth round of six talks, '2.13 mutual agreement' comprising the primary executive plans of the '9.19 joint statement' was deduced, and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula has been easy-sailing.

The 2.13 mutual agreement shows 5 executive issues and plans for establishment of the sixth conference and the Korean Peninsula Peace Forum. This targets dissolution of the Cold War oriented political structures and a newly reorganized order called Northeast Asian Peace and Security regime through denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the normalizations of North Korea-Japan and North Korea-US relationships.

## **II. U.S. Strategies for Eastern Asia and U.S. - China Relationships**

### **1. Consolidation of US-Japan Alliance and Siege against China**

It hadn't even been a year into Bush administration when 9.11 terror occurred. The U.S. Ministry of National Defense announced, in the "Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR)" in December 2001, that there are 7 countries including 5 non-nuclear weapon equipped countries considered target of nuclear preemptive attacks. This was followed by "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS 2002)" which, exceeding past 'concealment and suppression' formalized 'preemptive attack' and 'supremacy centered one-way principle.'

With this new national security strategy, the US also re-drew the East Asian strategies. The best example of Bush's new East Asian Strategies would be the first 'Armitage-Nye Report' released in October of 2000. This report, as Bush became the President in November 2000, established itself the root and stem of the East Asian Strategies. This report gives Japan the strategic status of "England of East Asia," suggesting that the Japan-US alliance is just as important as the England-US alliance.

The support of the Japanese member of the UN Security Council that was claimed in the first report of the "Armitage-Nye report" is evident in the 11th item of the joint statement of the U.S.-Japan security consultative committee of February 2005. The U.S. clarified its support officially in the fall of 2005 at the U.N. Reformation, stating it will "cooperate with the Japanese member of the UN Security Council to improve the efficiency of the Council."

The goal of the US in regards to the strategies for the East Asia is also visible in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2001 (QDR2001). QDR2001 divides Asia into two militaristic influential areas of Northeast Asia and East Asian Littoral. The goal of the U.S. and the allied army is to suppress any strives in Korea and to watch China. The East Asian Littoral appeared as an important strategic advantage as the US targets to protect the marine transportation lines and annihilate new possible threats such as terrorism, piracy, and drug dealings.

The US picked Japan and Australia as the central countries of Northeast Asia and East Asian Littoral to construct 2+2 strategic conference. The ultimate goal was to construct strategic council body among the US, Japan and Australia. It also wished to form a co-operational network among Southeast Asian countries, with the US and

Australia as central bodies.

As such, the East Asian Strategy of the first phase of the Bush Administration was to support Japan to build strong military and diplomatic ranking to compete against the newly rising China. Begun in 2003, the reorganization of US-Korea and US-Japan alliances have been directed in order to construct the Korean-US-Japan military network by strengthening US military in Japan. However, due to the withdrawal of the US government support, plans to advance Japan as a Security Council member failed, and the rejection of the Japanese government dismantled any plans of reinforcing the US military in Japan to a greater level.

The East Asian strategies and North Korean policies of the first phase of the Bush Administration was unable to handle North Korean Nuclear problems, alliance management, as well as the counter-China measures. As the North-South Korean relationships rapidly progressed and Korea-Chinese relationship deepened, as well as the Japan-Korea and Japan-China inter-conflicted, the Bush Administration concluded its first phase to be insufficient, and as a countermeasure, it started to pursue a new order in Northeast Asia.

## **2. Re-evaluation of China and Promotion of Joint Security**

With the delay of the post war clean-up measure of the Iraq war and emergence of Iran's nuclear crisis, the 2nd phase of the Bush administration removed the possibility of preemptive strike on North Korea and launched new more peace-friendly resolutions. The Secretary of State, Rice, although she claims that North Korea has a tyrannical tendency, announced that "the US government has no intent to attack or invade North Korea, but to support and promise security if the North wishes to abandon its nuclear programs in a non-reversible way.

This 2nd phase of the Bush administration diverges to two strategies; the diplomatic and the defensive. The diplomatic strategy, although not targeting North Korea directly, view the North Korean problems as an opportunity to bring together its surrounding countries to materialize a multi security policy. The defensive strategy is to prevent North Korea from operating illegal activities by means of financial restraints and/or a restraint by UN.

This strategy was visible through the National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006 (NSS2006). NSS2006, while claiming diplomatic dissolution of the

North Korean nuclear issues through a round of six talks, appoints the North a tyrannical country and targets cessation of tyranny as their main goal. This signifies the diplomatic goal of the 2nd Bush administration shifting from 'war with terror' to 'spread of democracy.'

The US started to notice the need of the joint security in Northeast Asian for the North Korean nuclear issues and for others. The Bush administration plans to build out the basis of the Northeast Asian joint security through the transformation of North Korean regime in co-operation with China. And this was the planned 'new order.'

As a result the US appoints China as the responsible stake holder in the world system and started Secretary level economical strategy conferences and Minister of State level high ranking security conference with China. As the US failed to prepare against China through the US-Japan alliance, it switched its plan to establish a new order reorganization of Korea and Northeast Asia. Hence, the strategy of the 2nd phase of Bush administration was to establish 'Northeast Asia cooperative framework' by means of dual agreement between US-Korea and US-Japan as well as with support of China.

However, the US still considers China a militaristic precaution target. In QDR200, the US department of National Defense stated four emphasized points; destruction of the terrorist network, defense of the homeland, choice plans for countries in need, prevention of acquisition and usage of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and such countries. In this, the Pentagon sorts China as a country that is making choices and worries about its increasing military power.

The denuclearization of the North is approached as a part of the prevention of acquisition and usage of WMD by terrorists and such countries. The wars in Afghan and Iraq, based on the preemptive doctrine in the 1st phase of the Bush Administration, only increased the threats of terror. As a result of the spread of terrorism and strife, the US was forced to change the '1-4-2-1 strategy,' mentioned in the QDR2001, to '1-n-2-1 strategy.'

It is, of course, hard to say that the US is completely genuine in its willingness to become China's partner in managing the order of Northeast Asia. In QDR2006, it was pointed out that alliances and cooperation with such countries as Korea and Japan are important. In other words, the US' new conception of Northeast Asia is based on strengthened US-Japan alliance, and indicates that the US is to manage China within

the NEA security collaboration.

Such intention is clearly apparent in the Armitage-Nye Report of 2006. The second report evaluates that the bipolar structure of the US-Japan alliance vs. China explained in the first report seemed unsuccessful due to the rise of China and complication of the issues in the Korean Peninsula, while also viewing that joint security structure with China is not suitable. Rather, it suggests to manage China by surrounding it with the basis of Japan-US alliance. The Atlantic Council of the US presented a similar conception of NEA new order. The report containing “a framework for peace and security in Korea and Northeast Asia” (2007.4) visualizes the new order in NEA, offers broad themes such as: agreement to denuclearize, round of four conference to replace the armistice agreement, the North Korea – US agreement projecting diplomatic relations normalization, South – North – US conference through militaristic trust and armament managements, and NEA multi-organizational agreement incorporating NEA peace and security.

As such, the US is trying to rebuild the order in NEA by resolving the issues in the Korean Peninsula including the North Korean Nuclear program. The new key to the turning point of the new NEA order is the solutions to the issues in the Peninsula. The US is enlarging NATO partnership all the way out to Asian and Pacific countries such as, Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand while promoting early normalization of North Korea – US relationship through diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issues of North Korea.

### **III. New conception towards NEA of the US and peace in the Korean Peninsula**

#### **1. The need for dissolution of Cold war based regimes in NEA**

During the Cold war, South Korea- US and Japan-US alliances formed, with the US as the leading body, Triangular security collaboration régime of South Korea-US-Japan on one side and North Korea-Soviet Union and North Korea-China alliance from the other side. This northern and southern triangular opposition structure started to disappear as South Korea and Russia normalized their relationship in 1990. Two years later in 1992, South Korea normalized its relationship with China. As a southern triangle country,

Korea established diplomatic relations with two northern triangle countries, China and Russia, one side of the NEAsian Cold war Based structure fell.

However, the relationships between Japan and North Korea and between Japan and the US are still hostile as they were during the Cold War. Efforts to normalize the North Korea-Japan relationship started in 1990 but complicated when “Lee Eun-Hye problem” emerged, and although resumed in April of 2000, due to kidnapping issues, was discontinued after two visits of Premier Goizumi in September 2002 and in May 2004. Efforts to normalize the US-North Korean relationship started since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in early 90’s and made some progress such as North Korea – US communication in 2000. However, there hasn’t been any significant advance in cessation of the hostility and normalization of their relationship.

Such remainder of Cold war based structure became the reason for nuclear programs. On one side, North Korea did show its intension to normalize its relationships with the US and Japan and to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, while operating nuclear programs on the other hand. Such behavior originated from being still in a hostile relation with the US and Japan with the fall of the northern triangle.

As a result, in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues and disassemble the Cold War structure, the end of war in the Korean Peninsula and friendly relations between the US and North Korea and between Japan and North Korea are necessary. These friendly relations may be important factors, but it is hard to consider itself the new order. The reorganization of the order is to form peace regime in the Korean peninsula, to build friendly relations between NK and Japan and between NK and US, and finally to constitute NEA security HQ.

## **2. 9.19 joint statement and NEA security collaboration**

Since the 2nd phase of the Bush administration the US and China started the reorganization of NEA order including the Korean peninsula. Specifically, after Rice became the Secretary of State, the US started to aggressively pursue to change the present situation. In the 9.19 joint statement, the US not only agreed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but also to the dissolution of the Cold War based regimes of NEA and the Korean Peninsula.

The movement to construct a new order in NEA appeared when Rice visited China as a national security aide in July 2004. Rice agreed on a wide range of Northeast

Asia issues including those pertaining the US-Chinese, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwanese. Shortly after the re-election of Bush, construction of a new order in NEA was discussed at Rice's visit to China in March 2005 and again in then-Deputy secretary of state Zoellick's visit in August of the same year.

As such, the US has accepted China's influence in NEA and acknowledged China as a strategic consultative partner. In August 13th 2005, at US-China summit talks, both countries agreed to a deputy secretary level conference, and the US acknowledged China as a "responsible stakeholder" in the global social issues including that of the Korean Peninsula and NEA. This reads as the US acceptance of China as a realistic partner in NEA strategy to discuss NEA security collaboration which both the US and China agree.

### **3. New Movements in the US and change in policies towards North Korea**

After the recent '2.13 Agreement' of the round of six conferences, the international status is changing rapidly. The most noticeable part of this change is in the policies towards North Korea. Both South and North Korea are busy trying to understand these new policies. Is the change tactical, or strategic, or is it something totally new? I, the author, believe that it is not a change in the fundamental perception of the North, but it may be considered a strategic change.

The first Bush Administration approached the nuclear issues of North Korea in the view of "the fight against terrorism." The Pentagon and Neocons from the other ministries continued the possibility of the preemptive nuclear attack, and as it was shown in April 2003 in a note of Minister Rumsfeld that circulated within the Pentagon indicated, 'a change of power in North Korea' was also being reviewed.

However, the US has been pursuing the 'Benign Neglect Policy' because of the wars in Afghan and Iraq. As a result, the policies towards North Korea of the 1st Bush administration only worsened the nuclear issues of North Korea. Even the early approaches of the 2nd administration weren't much different.

Due to a large number of Chinese Threat-theorists(중국위협론자) within the US administration, Rice's new East Asian strategies had difficulties progressing. The neocons within the administration pursued Chinese Threat-theorists(중국위협론) to surround China through Korea-US and US-Japan alliances. Also, by pursuing North Korean Mistrust-theory(북한불신론) including the nuclear issues, they put a stop to 9.19

joint statement. They also, by appointing human rights specialists, publicized North Korean human rights issues, and by mentioning forgery problems, put a financial restraint against the North.

As the hard-liners' opinions regarding the method of toward North Korea were supported in the US for the first time since 2005, the six-way talks were being delayed. While this talk was being delayed, the basic change of policies towards North Korea materialized among the White House and the Pentagon.

Entering May of 2006, the new conception supporters within the US hurried their movement, the cause being the complete normalization of the relationship between the US and Libya in May of 2006. Libya was, at one time, considered one of the depraved countries along with North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Iraq, and Syria, but has been pursuing alleviation in their relationship with the US since the termination of the nuclear program in December 2003. This was a good example of nuclear issues being resolved without the change in power.

Since then, the negotiation supporters that pursued the separation of 'the change of power' and 'the resolution of nuclear issues,' began to receive support. Shortly after, some aspects of the Zelikow Report including dual-operation of the six-way talks and a 'separate forum' that will discuss the peace regime, was mentioned. This report changed the approach of the US of 'nuclear program termination first and then friendship/ peace regime' to 'a simultaneous nuclear program termination and friendship/ peace regime.'

Councilor Zelikow, in his report that has a 'Broad New Approach', included, as a broad discussion about North Korea, issues concerning changes in politics, human rights, terrorism, and open society. Such approach targets a successful six-way summit talks and a separate forum among the North, the South, the US, and China to discuss about a peace regime in the Korean Peninsula, even before the complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues. However, the missile launch of the North at the time called for objection of the hard-liners, including the vice president Cheney, and as a result, this plan did not receive much support.

Considered an outpost action of the new NEAsian structure plan of the US, the North Korean policies faced a new era when Democrats held both the upper and the lower house at the off-year election. This eliminated many neocons in the administration. Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld resigned, followed by the resignation of

Ambassador Bolton who led the hard-line policy against North Korea in the UN, followed by that of Deputy Secretary Jorgiff(조지프) showing opposition to the 2.13 Agreement. As a result, the only neocons in the administration were Vice President Cheney, Vice Presidential National Security Counsel John Hanna(존한나), White House Security Counsel Crouch, and National Security Vice Counsel Abraham.

Now strengthened were the new conception supporters. President Bush, as announcing his will to resolve North Korean nuclear issues within his presidential service, structured Bush-Rice-Hill system, skipping Cheney. Finally, Bush's 'end of war' concept was introduced at the Korea-US-Japan summit talk at Hanoi in November. Bush's declaration that 'even before the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons by North Korea is realized, if there is some level of advancement toward resolving nuclear issue, three-way talks will take place enabling the signing of a truce' was the start of the reorganization of the new order in NEA and the Korean Peninsula.

The execution of the early phase of the 2.13 Agreement was completed in July 2007, despite the rough going around the BDA. The disablement of nuclear facilities and registration of the nuclear substances and programs is being promoted according to the 10.3 Agreement. If 10.3 Agreement is completely executed according to the plan, through a separate four-way talks, the discussion of the peace regime in the Korean peninsula can greatly progress, and further, a discussion about the peace and security regime in the NEA can be started. If this were to be, the reconstruction of the new order in the Korean peninsula and in the NEA will begin.

#### **IV. Current Status of the Progress in NEA Peace and Security**

##### **1. Opinions of the associated countries about the NEA peace and security**

Despite the partial disorganization of the Cold War based structures in NEA, there still exist remnants such as the hostile relations between North Korea and the US, and between North Korea and Japan. NEA is busy among the US, China, Russia, and Japan to grasp the leadership, and it has been difficult to discuss any form of security collaboration considering the historical backdrop among these countries.

However, the change in the US's policies toward North Korea gave the NEA joint security a new start. Secretary Rice, although she claims that North Korea has a

tyrannical tendency, announced that “the US government has no intent to attack or invade North Korea, but to support and promise security if the North wishes to abandon its nuclear programs in a non-reversible way.

Secretary Rice considers a diplomatic strategy to construct the joint security in NEA following the termination of the nuclear programs of North Korea. This diplomatic strategy, although not targeting North Korea directly, view the North Korean problems as an opportunity to bring together its surrounding countries to materialize a multi security policy. Also the US expects the discussions on the security collaboration, along with the normalization of the US-North Korean relations and the peace regime in the Korean Peninsula, to contribute to remove what North Korea claims to be its reason for keeping the nuclear program - national security.

NATO has a similar idea regarding a new order in NEA. In a report concerning ‘peace and security in Korea and Northeast Asia’(2007.4), it offers broad ‘frameworks’ including; denuclearization agreement, a round of four agreement to replace the truce, US-North Korean agreement including the normalization of their relationship, US-North-South Korean agreement through the formation of militaristic trust and armament management, and NEA joint organization agreement for peace and security in NEA.

China in the past did not support the security regimes or conferences since it may result in the encirclement of China; they are supportive to the construction of the joint security, suggesting the Korean Peninsula truce to a peace treaty, as an example. This can be read as China being satisfied with its responsibility in the six-way talks and ignoring other countries’ concerns for the rise of China, and seeing it as an opportunity to construct a basis of international relations.

Japan basically likes the new idea of the new order in NEA centering around the US-Japan alliance. But it also agrees to the need of the security conferences in preparation of surprises such as the withdrawal of the US military in Japan, militaristic expansion of China, or North Korean nuclear threats, while, at the same time, strengthening the US-Japan alliance and resolving concerns of other countries about the militaristic expansion of Japan. Japan is interested in the joint security collaboration in hopes of overcoming of the limitation of the ninth clause of the constitution, and through the participation in Korean Peninsula issues, it seeks to broaden its influence in the security of the area.

Russia also is in support toward the joint security conference to restore its influence

in NEA, and considers it a success even with a role in the materialization of the peace regime in the Korean peninsula and NEA. Since the extension of the peace regime to NEA will allow more chances for Russia to participate in the program, and it will also reduce the influential fraction of the US and Japan, Russia is willing to take place in the system.

North Korea was on the opposing side of the joint security idea since it may affect North Korea's control over power, but now sees it as an opportunity to contact the US, and is supporting the conference. However, if the conference becomes a place to judge and blame North Korea, it may either resign from it or be passive in the conference.

## **2. Status and progress of the Peace and security on NEA administration**

While the each participant of the six summits talks may think differently, their agreement toward the need of the joint security in NEA produced the NEA Peace and Security Administration. This administration is one of five administrations made to materialize 9.19 Joint Statement of the six-way talks according to the 2.13 Agreement in 2007.

This NEA Peace and Security Regime administration bases OSCE of Europe, SICA of the Central America, and ARF of the SEAsia as its models to promote the peace and security conference ideas in NEA.

It is expected that the principles of the collaboration and basic conceptions of the collaborative regime in NEA will be discussed in the round of six diplomat conference hosted according to the 10.3 Agreement, for the first time.

### **The first NEA Peace-Security Regime Administration Conference**

The NEA peace-security regime administration discussed the measures of organization for the collaboration regime, in Beijing-Russia embassy.

At this first conference, as the first step toward the formation of the regime, participants targeted to find the common ground in understanding the security by contrasting and comparing previous security treaties, previous promises made at the security related international organizations, collaboration outlines, and agreements and charters of security organizations.

US representative Secretary Hill, at the first administration conference, evaluated,

while stating that there are important and urgent administrations, the NEA Peace and Security administration is a very important administration.

#### Second NEA Peace-Security Regime Administration Conference

The second conference was held in Moscow in August. At this conference, principles and standard to materialize the mechanisms for NEA peace and security, and measures to build trust among the six participants were discussed.

Upon reviewing the UN Constitution, 9.19 Joint Statement, 2.13 Agreement, and other regional security agreements, the participants agreed that efforts to extract the common goals and principles need to be made. In addition, the participants decided to discuss about two plans after further consideration: the chair country (Russia) to come up with a draft and to distribute it to the other five participants, and the five participants to each come up with a plan and to submit them to Russia.

Pertaining to the intraregional trust formation, South Korea pointed out the fact that the South, Japan, the US, China, Russia, Canada, and India had gathered to operate a marine search training back in June 2006, and as was mentioned during the first conference, South Korea once again mentioned about a 'joint search training' again. South Korea suggested that if each country's organizations that are responsible for the marine rescues are interested, it would be good for them to have a conference.

The following table shows the contents of the six-way talks concerning NEA peace and security.

Agreement	Contents
4th item of the 9.19 joint agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Joint effort towards the permanent peace and security in NEA</li> <li>- Search for means and measures for advancement of the security collaboration in NEA</li> </ul>
3th item of the 2.13 agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Installation of NEA peace-security regime administration</li> <li>- Operational principles of the administration <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Each administration is to consult and establish concrete plans for the execution of the 9.19 joint statement in its own field.</li> <li>● Each administration is to report about the progress to the chief delegate of the six talk</li> <li>● In principle, progress of one administration should be irrelevant of the progress of another</li> <li>● Plans made by 5 administrations are to be carried out according to the mutually methods.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Item 2-1 of 10.3 agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reconfirmation of the round of six diplomat conference in Beijing at an appropriate time</li> <li>- Host a chief delegate conference in order to discuss the round of six diplomat conference and its topics</li> </ul>

### 3. Methods for the Promotion of the NEA Joint Security Collaboration

Henceforth, the joint security collaboration regime of NEA seems to progress in two directions. The first is a plan to move downwards starting from establishing the 'NEA joint security collaboration committee' by the six diplomats. And the second is to build upward from improving the NEA peace-security administration to constructing a joint security collaboration organization.

#### Establishment of the diplomat level NEA security conference

An extra round of six diplomat level NEA joint security collaboration conference may be established for international supports for joint security interests such as rescues and disaster managements, building militaristic trust, and protection of marine traffics. There have been diplomat level security conferences concerning few issues including yellow dust and avian flu.

Eight South Korea-China-Japan environment minister conferences have been held up

until December of 2006, and South Korea-Japan-China environment director conference is planned to be held to address issues concerning the yellow dust. And a South Korea -China-Japan health minister conference was held in March 2007 to discuss new issues including the avian flu.

There are South Korea-Japan-China or South Korea-Japan-China-Mongol minister level conferences for different issues, but the absence of the US, Russia, and North Korea makes it not a complete joint collaboration. In addition, as the topics of the conferences are only of the yellow dust and the avian flu, there clearly exists a limit.

On the other hand, the fifth item of the 2.13 Agreement reads; the six will confirm the execution of the 9/19 Joint Statement and search for the improvement of the NEA security collaboration through a minister level conference. Therefore, a diplomat conference is planned to be held before the end of 2007.

In that aspect, the round of six diplomat conference is the first security conference collaboration to discuss the security issues. If the round of six diplomat conference can be formalized until the North Korean nuclear issues are completely resolved, and be able to resolve other issues, it will rise to live up to its reputation as the NEA security collaboration conference.

#### Application of the NEA Peace Collaboration Regime Administration

The NEA security collaboration can advance to the next level through a proper utilization of the round of six NEA peace collaboration administrations. The first step is to construct the NEA peace-security regime administration according to the 2.13 Agreement. As reviewed above, this administration was established in March, and had held two conferences so far. At the conferences, the topics were current security issues excluding that of North Korea.

The second step is to permanently establish the administration as an executive office, and dispatch executive directors to each country. Initially, human security department, strife prevention department, and energy collaboration department will need to be established and the dispatched director will play director to those departments.

The third step is, at the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues, to expand each committee to a working organization. These transformations will follow the following details (see figure 1).

First of all, the NEA human security center will be established to discuss the human

welfare issues, including the yellow dust and avian flu, which the organization is already familiar with. In this center, three mutual interests in NEA are managed; health, environment, and food securities. Also, NEA refugee conference will be prepared basing this center in case of a large refugee situations caused by an upheaval and/or natural disasters.

Next, strife prevention center will be established. Joint security issues such as joint marine search training, which all six participants understand, will be discussed. And the participants will cooperate to share information and materials concerning piracy to protect marine traffic of NEA and SEA countries. Also, it will prevent conflicts regarding property ownership and others from turning into a strife.

Lastly, energy collaboration center will be established. If the round six-way talks meets its primary goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, this center will become the ‘economic and energy collaboration administration’ and ‘Korean Peninsula denuclearization administration’. China, South and North Korea and Japan all stand on a common ground in that they are all countries with limited resources.

Figure 1 Conceptual representation of the progress of the NEA peace-security regime.

Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Installation of the administration</li> <li>- Beginning of the round of six diplomat conference</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Installation of a separate executive office</li> <li>- Formalization of the round of six diplomat conference</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Development to a independent cooperative organization</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establishment of the executive office and selection of the discussion topic other than the North Korean nuclear issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organization of the three departments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Human security centre</li> <li>- Strife prevention center</li> <li>- Energy collaboration center</li> </ul>

#### IV. Conclusion

The new organization of the order in the Korean Peninsula has been suddenly

progressing since the adoption of the 9.19 Joint Statement of the six-way summit talks in 2005. The tension maximized in 2006 with the missile launch and nuclear tests on North Korea, but the 2.13 Agreement, containing basic executive plans of the statement, was agreed and carried out in 2007. In addition, through the 10.3 Agreement, disablement of nuclear facilities and programs are agreed to be done before the year end, and, as a result, betterment of the US-North Korea relationship and construction of the peace regime in the Korean peninsula sped up.

The key to this improvement was the change of the policies toward North Korea of the Bush Administration of the US. This was possible as North Korea reacted positively to the change of the attitude of the US. The mood seems fine for now, but it is hard to guarantee absolutely.

In 2000, there was an opportunity of normalization of the US-North Korean relationship, but it was lost when North Korea failed to understand its value. If North Korea loses this chance again, it will have to face a worse consequence. This is because, although there are restraints of only the US, Japan, and Australia, when North Korea does not lose the nuclear program, the possible extra restraints from the US security council may be executed.

There are many important political schedules in many countries including Korea in 2008. There will be a new government in Korea in February 2008, and a general election is scheduled in April. There are a presidential election in Russia and a general election in Taiwan in March. Beijing Olympics will take place in China in August of 2008. There is a presidential election in the US in November 2008 and a new government in January of next year.

If these events were used properly, the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues and betterment of the US-North Korean relationship and progression of the peace regime in the Korean Peninsula may result. The Chinese government needs a secure environment more than ever for the successful Beijing Olympics. Before the presidential election race in the US begins would be a good period to sustain such North Korean policies.

There isn't, however, any guarantee of containment of such attitude from China. Although it has been hiding its hostile attitude towards North Korea, China may, basing its newly risen reputation as a result of the Beijing Olympics, start an oppression policy against North Korea. The US may be too busy to improve the US-Korean

relationship while trying to set up the diplomatic team with the new government.

There isn't ample time to process the normalization of the US-North Korean relationship and promotion of the peace regime of the Korean Peninsula to accord with the denuclearization schedule. There cannot be any problems for the whole process to function. The re-organization of the order provides us peace and opportunity to prosper, but also it may lead us away from the correct understanding of Korea under the leadership of the US and China. The Korean race depended solely on the choices of the powerful in the last two attempts of reorganization of the order in NEA. Are we to commit yet another mistake or to realize the self-determination?

There around the Korean Peninsula exists a diverging road. North and South Korea are facing two options; one being choosing the different roads and re-experiencing the miserable hike of separation on different paths and the other being a hike heading towards the grand unification of the Korean race on the same road. In such aspects, the 2007 North-South summit talk and the 10.4 Joint Statement will be evaluated, although separated as the North and the South, as an active movement of our people in the reorganization of the order in NEA.